Government Contract Bid Protests: Judicial Review
and the Role of the Court of Claims
Each year the federal government awards contracts worth billions
of dollars to obtain needed goods and services.' In fiscal 1970, payments
under these contracts amounted to more than one-half of all federal
expenditures 2 and, together with procurements by state and local governments, accounted for roughly 23 percent of the gross national product.3 Procurement of goods and services by federal agencies is governed
by an extensive set of statutes and regulations. 4 Because of the complexity of the procurement system and the vital economic interests
that it affects, there are occasional disputes between government contract officers and disappointed bidders concerning the precise requirements of these statutes and regulations and the factual situations to
which they must be applied.5 Until recently, bidders who believed that
government officers had somehow violated or misapplied applicable
statutory or regulatory provisions in awarding contracts to their competitors could submit their claims to only two fora: the Comptroller
General and the Court of Claims. Each of these, however, affords only
a limited measure of review and allows forms of relief that may, in
many cases, be inadequate. 6 Nonetheless, before 1970, federal courts
other than the Court of Claims refused to review government contract
disputes on the grounds that disappointed bidders had no legal right
1 $100.8 billion was spent by the federal government in fiscal year 1970. U.S. DFrIT OF
CozMnmRCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrED STATES

874, table 574.

2Id.

3 Id. at 306, table 485.
4 Among the many laws and regulations dealing wholly or in part with the procurement process, those most important to federal procurement in general are: Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. § 2301-14 (1970); Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C. 88 251-60 (1970); Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. pts. 1-39 (1972); and Federal Procurement Regulations, 41
C.F.R. §§ 1-1.000 et seq. (1972). Other acts that concern procurement include the DavisBacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1970); Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act of
1962, 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-32 (1970); and the Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
5 The Comptroller General hears seven hundred to one thousand cases annually that
allege violations of procurement statutes and regulations. See Wheelabrator Corp. v.
Chafee, 455 F.2d 1806, 1315 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6 For a discussion of the review provided by the Comptroller General and by the Court
of Claims, see text at notes 40-59 infra.
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that had been violated and, hence, no standing to bring suit, and that
an agency's action in awarding a contract was discretionary 7
In 1970, in Scanwell Laboratoriesv. Shaffer,8 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit abandoned this traditional refusal
to intervene in the procurement process, holding that disappointed
bidders for government contracts have standing to challenge agency
contract bid decisions in the federal courts. Scanwell did not, however,
define the bid protest cases in which review by the federal courts is
appropriate, nor did it determine the scope of review that the courts
must apply. While bidders' suits are finally permitted, these problems
remain unresolved and, together with limitations that have thus far
been placed on available relief, seem to have discouraged bid litigation. 9
This comment discusses the government contract bidding process
insofar as it is conducted by means of formal advertising rather than
negotiation. It then outlines the administrative and judicial review
presently available to disappointed bidders, with particular attention to
the institutional and pragmatic difficulties confronted by the courts
in their brief experience with review of bid protests.
7 Most of the decisions refusing review of government contracting procedures were
based on lack of standing to sue. In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 810 U.S. 113 (1940), the
leading authority for this proposition, the Supreme Court held that prospective bidders
did not have standing because no "legal right" had been violated. Id. at 125. Earlier
cases had held that regulations governing contracting were for the protection of the govermnent and the public, and not for the protection of those persons who seek to or do
contract with the government, American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S.
75 (1922); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88 (1915); that goveminent rejection of bids was discretionary and not reviewable, Champion Coated Paper
Co. v. Joint Comm., 47 App. D.C. 141 (D.C. Cir. 1917); B.F. Cummins Co. v. Burleson, 40
App. D.C. 500 (D.C. Cir. 1913); O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934); that
accepting or rejecting bids was discretionary, and mandamus would not lie to compel
such action, Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913); that a disappointed bidder (for a
municipal contract) lacked standing to sue, Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 78 F. 28 (8th
Cir. 1897), appeal dismissed, 166 U.S. 719 (1897); and that suit was barred by sovereign
immunity, Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918). For thirty years after the Supreme Court's
decision in Perkins, courts held that disappointed bidders lacked standing. E.g., Edelman
v. FHA, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967). For the history of nonreview of procurement problems, see Judge Tamm's opinion in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859
(D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Pierson, Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards: Its Origins, Rationale and Effect on the Procurement Process, 12 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. Rav. 1 (1970).
8 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
9 In a six-month period, five bid cases in the District Court for the District of Columbia were dismissed on motion of the plaintiff or on stipulation by both parties. Tasker
Indus. v. Seamans, Civil No. 3482-70 (D.D.C., Feb. 8, 1971); Minor v. Paine, Civil No.
2236-70 (D.D.C., Nov. 9, 1970); Law Bros. v. Resor, Civil No. 2137-70 (D.D.C., Sept. 17,
1970); Arvin Indus. v. Chafee, Civil No. 2314-70 (D.D.C., Aug. 10, 1970); Winston v.
Kunzig, Civil No. 1894-70 (D.D.C., Aug. 7, 1970).
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THE BIDDING SYSTEM, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
AND THE COURT OF CLAIMS

A. Advertised Bid Procedures and Protests
Although many government contracts are awarded by negotiation, 0
advertised bidding is the method of procurement preferred by law;"
a number of statutes and regulations direct government officials to use
it whenever feasible. 12 Congress favors formal advertisement because, at
13
least presumably, it maximizes competition for contract awards.
The first step in the advertising process is the drafting and issuance of
the invitation for bids. The requirements of the procuring agency are
set forth as specifically as possible to ensure that goods of the requisite
quality are obtained 4 and that bidders are informed equally of the
government's needs.' 5 The invitation must state the time, place, and
date for opening the sealed bids.' It must be published, either by mailing invitations to bidders whose names appear on government-maintained lists of eligible bidders,' 7 by placing announcements in trade
journals or newspapers, 18 or by including a notice of the procurement
10 Negotiated procurements account for more than half of the dollar value of all federal procurements, Pierson, supra note 7, at 2; in 1964, they accounted for 85 percent of
the dollar value of military procurements, SUBCOMM. ON FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMa., 89TH CONG., 1sr Sss., BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON
EcoNoMIc IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT 21 (1966).

11 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1970); 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1970).
12 See 32 C.I. § 1.300-2 (1972); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.301-2, 1-2.102(a) (1972).
Is See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Competition
is maximized by allowing all companies capable of producing an item or providing a service to bid for the contract, and by guaranteeing equal knowledge of the government's
needs to all bidders. See also 32 C.F.R. § 1.101 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.002 (1972).
14 R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw 226 (1969). Professors Nash and
Cibinic point out that, wherever there is leeway in the specifics, bidders will offer the
lowest quality possible within the specifications since award is based primarily on price.
15 The preparation of an invitation of the requisite specificity is relatively simple for
items of common usage and relatively difficult for complex or novel items. Cf. 32 C.F.R.
§ 2.201 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.201 (1972).
16 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 2.201 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.201 (1972). The date
set must allow a sufficiently long time for companies to prepare bids. 32 C.F.R. § 2.202-1
(1972); 41 C.FYR. § 1-2.202-1(a) (1972); J. PAUL, UNrrED STATEs GOVERNMENT CoNTRACTs
AND SUBcoNTRAcrs 150 (1964). The time and cost of bid preparation varies greatly, increasing with the complexity and novelty of the performance solicited. Cf. 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.202-1
(b) (1972).
17 32 C.F.R. § 2.203-1 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.203-1 (1972). Bidders may apply to have
their names added to these bidder mailing lists, 32 C.F.R. § 2.205-1(b) (1972); 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-2.205-1(b) (1972); and failure to respond to an invitation may result in removal of a
bidder's name from the list, 32 C.F.R. § 2.205-2(a) (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.205-2(a) (1972);
R. NAsH & J. Cmimc, supra note 14, at 223; J. PAUL, supra note 16, at 149.
18 32 C.F.R. § 2.203-3 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.203-3 (1972); R. NASH & J. CIBiNIc, supra
note 14, at 223.
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in the Commerce Department's "Synopsis of United States Government
Proposed Procurements, Sales and Contract Awards."' 19 Interested
bidders must submit sealed bids to the contracting officer handling
20
the procurement before the deadline announced in the invitation.
At that time, the contracting officer opens all bids publicly 2' and selects
22
one for award.
In making this selection, the contracting officer is required to make
three determinations. First, he must conclude that the accepted bid
is "most advantageous to the government, price and other factors considered." 23 Second, he must decide whether the bid is responsive to the
advertised invitation, that is, whether it conforms to the specifications
of the invitation in all material respects. 24 Finally, the contracting
officer must determine that the bidder receiving the award is "responsible": that he is capable of delivering the goods and services required
in the prospective contract. 25 To determine a firm's responsibility, the
agency may conduct a preaward survey of its facilities, finances and
experience,2" or, in the case of small businesses, the Small Business
Administration may be asked to certify competence to meet contract
27
requirements.
Bid protests have often centered upon alleged error in the latter
two determinations, those concerning the disappointed bidder's responsiveness to the invitation and his ability to fulfill the contract.
19 32 C.F.R. § 2.203-4 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.203-4 (1972); J. PAUL, supra note 16, at 150.
20 32 C.F.R. § 2.302 (1972); 41 CX.IL § 1-2.302 (1972); see Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D).D.C. 1970).
21 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970); 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1970).
22 Id. An agency may reject all bids rather than make an award when "the agency
head determines that it is in the public interest to do so." Id.
23 Id.; 32 C.F.R. § 2.407-1 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.407.1 (1972).
24 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.301(a) (1972) provides: "To be considered for award, a bid must comply in all material aspects with the invitation for bids so that, both as to the method and
timeliness of submission and as to the substance of any resulting contract, all bidders
... 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.404-2(a) (1972) states: "Any bid
may stand on an equal footing.
which fails to conform to the essential requirements of the invitation for bids . .. shall
be rejected as non-responsive." Similar provisions are contained in 32 C.F.R. 3§ 2.301,
2.404-2 (1972).
25 32 C.F.R. § 1.904-1 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1204-1(a) (1972). The integrity of the
bidder is also a factor in responsibility. 32 C.F.R. § 1.903-1(d) (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1203-1
(d) (1972). This factor relates to the probable inclination of the bidder to perform as required instead of his capacity to do so.
26 32 C.F.R. § 1.905-4 (1972); J. PAUL, supra note 16, at 153.
27 32 C.F.R. § 1.705-4(a) (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.708-1 (1972). 39 Co?"r. GEN. 868 (1960)
holds that a certificate of competency from the Small Business Administration is binding
upon the contracting officer. Contra, Warren Bros. Rds. Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl.
714 (1965). The Comptroller General's decision seems more in conformity with 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(b)(7) (1970). But see 32 C.F.R. § 1.705-4(a), (f, (g) (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.708-3 (1972).
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Bids may fail to be responsive to the invitation for any one of several
reasons: if the bid invitation is ambiguous, the bidder's understanding
of it may differ from that of the contracting officer; 28 the bidder may
make a mistake in the form of his submission by failing, for example,
to sign the bid; 29 the bidder may deviate from the invitation's requirements in what he considers a minor detail or may request an exemption
from certain requirements;30 or, finally, the bidder may knowingly
submit a bid that does not meet the standards set out in the invitation
in the hope that his bid will be lowest and that he will, therefore,
obtain the contract.3 1 Difficulties in applying the responsibility requirement and, hence, disputes concerning its application seem generally to
have resulted from a lack in the statutes and regulations of any specific
standards to guide the contracting officer in making this determination.
The criteria of responsibility provided in the statutes and regulationsthat the successful bidder have "adequate financial resources" and a
"satisfactory record of integrity, judgment and performance" 8 2-- necessarily require the contracting officer to make subjective, ad hoc judgments and lead to disputes as to whether the officer's notion of what
is adequate or satisfactory is correct.
Another ground for protest commonly alleged by bidders is that a
bid invitation was defective, either because it was ambiguous as to what
product or service was desired or as to how the bids were to be eval28 A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 726
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
29 Superior Oil Co. v. Udall. 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969). But see 32 C.F.R. § 2.405(c)
(1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2A05(c) (1972). Bids have also been found nonconforming where the
accompanying bond is insufficient. Cf. United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v.
Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C.), aff'd 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
8o 34 ComP. GEN. 24 (1954); 30 Comp. GEN. 179 (1950). The frequency of "minor" deviations from IFB specifications and of requests for permission to deviate from the invitation indicate that many government bidders believe they have some opportunity to
bargain with the procuring agency. R. NASH & J. CMINIC, supra note 14, at 226; Shnitzer,
Ambiguities in Invitations and Bids, 68 BREFING PAPERS No. 6, at 9 (1968). Where the
deviation affects "price, quantity or quality of the articles offered," it cannot be waived.
30 CoaN. GEN. 179 (1950). A request that causes a bid to be ambiguous may be a ground
for rejection of the bid, even though it would be the low bid under any interpretation.
Id. Contra, Shnitzer, supra, at 6. But see 32 C.F.R. § 2.404-2(d) (1972); 41 CF.R. § 1-2.404-2
(b) (1972).
81 Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
32 32 C.F.R. § 1.903 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1203-1 (1972). Complaints by bidders over
determinations that they are not responsible, or that lower bidders are, seldom result in
reversal of the contracting officer's decision. For example, the contracting officer's decision
that a bidder who provided 80 percent of the helicopter services in a region was not
qualified for a contract to furnish helicopter services in that region was sustained. 36
Comp,. GEN. 42 (1956).
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uated,-s or because the invitation was overly restrictive, requiring, or
seeming to require, inclusion in the bids of features unnecessary to the
procurement. 4 In either case, if a bid invitation does not serve as an
accurate guide for bidders, the agency may cancel it and readvertise the
procurement. 35
Finally, there have frequently been allegations by disappointed
bidders that either government officials or other bidders have engaged
in fraud or other misconduct. Bidders have complained, for example,
that contracting officials had let contracts to favored bidders after
fraudulently rejecting lower bids;38 that other bidders had engaged in
collusive bidding;3 7 and that other bidders had misled government
officers by making false statements 8 or by submitting the products of
other companies as their own. 9
Bid Protest Fora: The General Accounting Office and the Court of
Claims
Although contracting agencies have boards of contract appeals to
consider disputes concerning contract terms, there are no similar
administrative review boards to consider the kinds of bidders' protests
described above. 40 Prior to the Scanwell decision, therefore, the only
B.

83 Shnitzer, supra note 30. Although factors to be considered in evaluating bids cannot be stated precisely, they may be used. 43 Comp'. GEN. 663 (1964). Examples of such
vague but relevant evaluation factors for lease of office space are: usefulness of space for
good office layout; availability of transportation, parking, and eating facilities; and physical characteristics of the building and neighborhood. Id.
84 44 Comn,. GEN. 302 (1964); Bronson, The Sovereign in the Market-Place-A Panoramic View of Legal Peculiaritiesof Contracting with the Federal Government, 4 WASH-

BuRN L. REV. 45, 55 n.55 (1964).
35 32 C.F.R. § 2.404-1(b)(1) (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.404-1(b)(1) (1972); 42 Comr. GEN. 257
(1962).
86 E.g., United States v. Gray Line Tours, 311 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1962). Usually
complaints of fraud arise when a number of lower bids are rejected and the contract
awarded for a relatively high bid. In Heyer Prods. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 251
(Ct. Cl. 1959), ten bids were submitted, and the lowest six were rejected. The bid accepted was nearly double that of the protesting company. Disappointed bidders may also
complain that there is a tie between the company receiving the award and the government. In one case, a company operating an Atomic Energy Commission plant helped
draft specifications for equipment to be added to the plant. The three lowest bids were
rejected as nonresponsive, and the company that drafted the specifications received the
award. 38 Comp. GEN. 59 (1958).
87 Lind v. Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1968); 39 ComP. GEN. 524 (1960).
88 Royal Servs., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966).
89 39 Comr. GEN. 254 (1959).

40 Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 349, 374 (1970). See also Levanthal, Public Contracts and Administrative
Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 35, 39-40 (1966).
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fora open to disappointed bidders were the General Accounting Office
and the Court of Claims.
1. Review by the General Accounting Office. The Comptroller
General, who is the chief executive officer of the General Accounting
Office (GAO), has no explicit statutory authority to review bidders'
protests. 41 The GAO, acting as an arm of Congress responsible for
ensuring efficient operation of the government, 42 must certify the accounts of disbursing officers; it may withhold approval of disbursements
if they are made for improper purposes or pursuant to invalid contracts.43 The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gives disbursing
officers, who are personally liable for improper expenditure of government funds, 44 a right to decisions in advance by the Comptroller General concerning the legality of proposed payments. 45 Although the
statute extends the right of GAO review neither to bidders nor to
contracting officers, the GAO has, since its inception, afforded review
of bidders' protests and has rendered decisions on disputed matters
when requested to do so by contracting officers.
Bidders may file protests with the Comptroller General alleging that
the procuring agency has failed to comply with any of the applicable
statutes or regulations. After receipt of a protest, the Comptroller
solicits comments from the agency. 46 Informal conferences are usually

held whenever requested by either the bidder or contracting agency,
and other bidders interested in the procurement in question are allowed
47

to participate.

Although review by the GAO may operate effectively as a check on
inefficiencies that result from violations of bid regulations, it does not
41 MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE & COUNCIL FOR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE-

MENT, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR AND THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 10 (1966)
[hereinafter MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE]; Cibinic & Lasken, supra note

40, at 350.
42 31 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74 (1970).
43 John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. CI. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 931 (1964). See generally MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCS INSTITUTE, supra note 41;
Birnbaum, Government Contracts: The Role of the Comptroller General, 42 A.B.A.J. 433
(1956); Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40; Owens, A Primer of Procurement by Formal
Advertising and Relief for Mistakes in Bids, 42 N.Y. St. B.J. 428 (1970); Shnitzer, Changing Concepts in Government Procurement-the Role and Influence of the Comptroller
General on Contracting Officer's Operation, 23 FED. B.J. 90 (1963); Witte, Protesting the
Award of Government Contracts, 12 PRAc. LAw., Mar., 1966, at 60.
44 Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40, at 858.
45 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970). Another provision for advance GAO decisions to disbursing
officers was included in the Disbursing and Certifying Officers Act of 1941, 31 U.S.C. § 82(d)
(1970).
46 Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40, at 374-75; Witte, supra note 43.
47 Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40, at 374-75.
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guarantee to bidders administrative compliance with procurement law.
Unlike federal agencies that regulate labor relations, communications,
commerce, and securities, the GAO was not designed to be a forum
for the resolution of competing interests. It was, instead, intended
primarily to perform investigative and auditing functions, 48 and the only
interest it is mandated to serve is the public interest in efficient government. Perhaps because of this limited mission, the GAO has failed to
provide procedures adequate to protect the interests of disappointed
bidders. It makes no provision in bid protest cases for formal hearings
with opportunities for interested parties to present evidence and oral
argument concerning the alleged violations. Instead, absent "convincing evidence" to the contrary, the GAO accepts as true the facts contained in the comments it solicits from the procuring agency. 49
The limited mission of the GAO is also reflected in the restricted
nature of the remedies granted by the Comptroller and in his reluctance
to grant relief even when a bidder's protest is meritorious. If the
Comptroller finds that a violation of bid regulations has occurred, he
may direct that the procurement be cancelled and readvertised or that
certain bids be rejected or reconsidered. 50 The Comptroller does not,
however, order agencies to award contracts to bidders who would have
received them had the applicable regulations been followed; nor can he
award damages. Even the limited remedy of contract cancellation may
be withheld if work on the contract has proceeded so far that cancellation would be inefficient. 51 The GAO's reluctance to reverse agency
48

UACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUcrs INSITUTE,

49 42 COmP.

GEN. 126, 134 (1962);

supra note 41, at 17-33.

MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUars INSTITUTE,

supra

note 41, at 58; Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40, at 374.
50 Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40, at 874. There is some dispute as to the binding
nature of the Comptroller General's decisions. Compare John Reiner & Co. v. United
States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); MACHINERY AND ALLIE PRODucrs INSTrUTE, supra note 41; Cibinic & I.asken, supra note 40 with Shnitzer,
supra note 43 and Welch, The General Accounting Office in Government Procurement,
14 FED. B.J. 321 (1954). But executive agencies uniformly comply with his directives.
51 MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INsrrrUTE, supra note 41, at 49; J. PAUL, supra
note 16, at 159-60; Owens, supra note 43, at 428; Witte, supra note 43, at 64. See generally Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 40. In fiscal year 1971, the Comptroller General
rendered 715 formal decisions in bid protest cases, of which 641 protests were denied and
74 were sustained. Only in four cases did the Comptroller recommend contract cancellation. Address by Paul G. Dembling, General Counsel, General Accounting Office, before
the National Contract Management Association, Washington, D.C., Sept., 1971, cited in
Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1314 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Even where
there was an uncontested claim that another bidder received a contract award due to
fraud, the Comptroller General has refused to recommend cancellation. 39 Comra. GEN.
254 (1959). But see 34 CoMP. GEN. 82, 84 (1954): "The strict maintenance of the competi-

tive bidding procedures required by law is infinitely more in the public interest than ob-
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action is illustrated by one case in which, of three bids submitted, only
two were accompanied by product samples that met the specifications
contained in the invitation for bids. The contract was awarded to the
firm that had made the lower of the two responsive bids. The other
responsive bidder protested, claiming that the sample submitted by the
successful bidder was, in fact, the protesting company's product. This
assertion was not disputed, but the Comptroller General, nonetheless,
upheld the award, stating that, although the contractor's action would
have constituted an unfair business practice had it occurred in interstate commerce, it was permissible in bidding for government contracts.52
2. Review by the Court of Claims. In 1956, when other federal
courts refused to entertain any action protesting government contract
awards, the Court of Claims, which has jurisdiction over nontort
damage suits against the federal government,5 3 extended review to one
type of bidder's suit. In Heyer Products v. United States,"4 the court
held that unsuccessful bidders could recover bid preparation expenses
if they could demonstrate that bids were invited in bad faith after
contracting officers had already decided which firm would receive the
contract. The relief promised by Heyer Products has remained, however, a matter of potential since neither in that case nor in any subsequent case has a bidder been able to establish that government officers
invited bids in bad faith. 58 Nonetheless, following the decision in
Scanwell,5 6 the Court of Claims extended its review to bid protests
alleging arbitrary actions other than the narrow bad faith invitation of
Heyer Products.5 7 The decision to extend review to these additional
cases was announced in Keco Industries,Inc. v. United States.55 At the
same time, however, the court stated that bidders could only receive
damage awards limited to reimbursement for bid preparation costs.5 9
taining a pecuniary advantage in individual cases by permitting practices which do

violence to the spirit and purpose of the law."
52 59 Coup. GEN. 254, 256-57 (1959).
53 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
54 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
55 Robert F. Simmons & Assocs. v. United States, 360 F.2d 962 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Trans
Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Green Manor Constr.
Co. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl.413 (1965); Iscrow v. United States, 161 Ct. CI. 875 (1963);
Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. CL. 1960); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 149
Ct. Cl. 837 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815 (1961); Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States,
177 F. Supp. 251 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
56 Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57 E.g., Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 426 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
58 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
59 Id. at 1240.
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II.

JuDIcIAL REvIEw

A.

The Scanwell LaboratoriesDecision
Despite the absence of formal administrative machinery to deal with
bid disputes, the inadequacy of the Comptroller General's review to
protect the interests of bidders, and the limitations placed upon the
Court of Claims' review by the Heyer Products rule, until 1970 other
federal courts refused to review government contract awards in actions
brought by disappointed bidders. 0° This refusal was based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., in which the
Court held that prospective bidders had no legal rights injured by the
promulgation of regulations that they claimed were illegal.6 ' Although
the Supreme Court abandoned the legal right test for standing shortly
after the Perkins decision, 2 that case-and its dictum that awarding
a contract was a discretionary act of government-was cited until the
Scanwell Laboratoriesdecision as precluding review of the legality of
contract awards.0 3
Scanwell Laboratorieswas the culmination of a series of cases decided
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that had,
in effect, undermined the Perkins decision as authority for denying
standing to disappointed bidders.64 In Scanwell, the court recognized
the abandonment of the legal right test and found that the bidders'
60 See cases cited note 7 supra.
61 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
62 See Judge Tamm's discussion of the standing cases in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MicH. L. Itxv. 540 (1971); Comment, Competitors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action-Recent Federal Developments, 48
N.C.L. REV. 807 (1970).
63 Edelman v. FHA, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Gray Line Tours, 311
F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962); Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Fulton Iron Co. v.
Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 903 (1949); Walter P. Villere
Co. v. Blinn, 156 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1946); Lind v. Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal.
1968). For cases precluding review on similar grounds, see Royal Servs., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966); and Szmodis v. Romney, 307 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.

Pa. 1969).
64 See Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (companies that do
business with the government had standing to challenge regulations terminating their
business relations); Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (enjoining
a government lease of land to the high bidder, found by the court to have been nonresponsive, and compelling lease to the plaintiff, second high bidder); Gonzales v. Freeman,
334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (contractor had standing to protest debarment); Copper
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (contractor had
standing to challenge an administrative regulation that would make him ineligible for
government contracts for a three-year period); George v. Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (contractor had standing to attack an administrative interpretation of the WalshHealy Act that debarred him from contract awards).
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standing to sue was supported by two interests: first, the interest of the
bidder himself as a person allegedly harmed in fact by illegal, arbitrary,
capricious action; and second, the interest of the public, represented
by the bidder as a "private attorney general," in having government
contracts awarded fairly and according to defined rules.65
Review after Scanwell: Bidders' Suits under the Administrative
Procedure Act
Although Scanwell held that bidders have standing to bring actions
for review of government contract awards, the court did not thereby
hold that all federal contract decisions are necessarily subject to judicial
review in suits brought by disappointed bidders; nor did it define the
scope of review that the courts should apply. In short, Scanwell resolved only the threshold question of standing; and bid cases since
Scanwell indicate that the courts remain uncertain not only as to what
contract awards are subject to review and what scope of review is appropriate, but also as to the substantive criteria for determining whether
injunctive relief is warranted. These issues-standing, reviewability,
scope of review, and remedies-are analytically distinct. Nevertheless,
the opinions in bid cases often seem to confuse them, perhaps because,
in deciding them, the courts must take many of the same considerations
into account.
The Administrative Procedure Act does not provide entirely clear
standards for making these determinations. The section of the Act
governing reviewability insulates agency actions from review "to the
extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law." 66 This language allows the
courts a considerable degree of latitude to determine the extent to
which a statute expressly prohibiting review or declaring administrative
action discretionary should operate to make an agency action unreviewable. Courts have, for example, agreed to inspect the rationality of
discretionary determinations in procurement 7 and other fields, 68 and
have indicated willingness to review allegedly fraudulent administrative decisions even where a statute clearly states that the kind of decision
in question is not subject to review.6 9 At the same time, courts have
in some cases declined to review agency actions even though they are
not sheltered by the reviewability provisions of the Act and meet other
constitutional and judicially created standards for review.7 0
B.

65 424 F.2d at 862-65, 872-73.
66 5 U.S.C.

§ 701 (1970).
67 See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

68 E.g., Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
69 See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
70 Cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
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The provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act that govern
scope of review leave even more room for the exercise of judicial discretion than does the section governing reviewability. The Act appears
to specify three different scopes of review, each applicable to a different
type of administrative determination. First, when administrative actions are taken after hearings required either under the Act or another
statute, the Act allows the courts to decide whether allegedly erroneous
factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence on the
record.7 1 If, therefore, an agency action may be taken without a hearing,
courts may be precluded from reviewing factual decisions directly.
Second, the Act states that the courts "shall decide all relevant questions
of law." 72 Thus, if the challenged agency action rests explicitly or
implicitly on an interpretation of law, the reviewing court determines
whether the agency interpretation is correct. This review of questions
of law is qualified, however, by the Act's reviewability provision: 73
where legal interpretation is entrusted to the agency, no direct review of
the decision may be afforded. Finally, the Act states that the courts
"shall ...

hold unlawful ...

agency actions, findings and conclusions

found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." 74 Under this provision, a reviewing court
may set aside factual determinations, including those not subject to the
substantial evidence test, and legal decisions, including those committed
to agency discretion, if it finds that the administrator acted arbitrarily,
without a rational basis.
The provisions of the Act, although complex, appear to define the
scope of review appropriate to any challenge to administrative action.
Some problems are evident, however, in the courts' application of the
Act. First, an administrative determination may not fit neatly into
any one of the categories defined by the Act, each with its appropriate
scope of review.7 5 And second, the generalized language of the Act
cannot take into account the competing interests that favor or oppose
review in a particular case-interests that the courts may feel compelled
to identify and weigh in determining the extent to which they should
review agency action. As a result, courts may decide, first, whether the
interests involved in a case militate for or against extensive review and
then decide accordingly the appropriate scope of review to apply. Thus,
when a court finds that, on balance, the interests weigh against broad
review, it may hold that the action in question is discretionary and sub71 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
72 Id. § 706.
73 Id. § 701.
74

Id. § 706(2)(A).

75 See

K.C.

DAVIs,

4 ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE

§ 30.01 (1958).
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ject only to the rational basis test, or that the issue is one of fact and can
be reviewed only for substantial evidence, even if the action rested,
explicitly or implicitly, on an interpretation of law.7 6
In bidders' suits, as in other cases involving judicial review of administrative actions, the courts' decisions as to reviewability and, particularly, scope of review seem often to turn upon their evaluation of the
interests that these decisions will affect. The courts have recognized
two sometimes competing interests involved in actions brought by disappointed bidders: the interest of both the bidder and the public
in administrative fairness and the public interest in efficient operation
of the government. The public interest in fairness and in compliance
with announced rules reflects concern for control of the government's
exercise of power.77 And the bidder is, of course, interested in fairness
because failure, whether intentional or inadvertent, to award contracts
fairly and according to prescribed standards subjects bidders who would
otherwise have been successful to the loss of both bid preparation ex78
penses and profits from the prospective contract.
While courts have repeatedly noted the importance of these interests
that favor broad review of contracting officers' decisions, they have
generally found them outweighed by the public interest in efficient
operation of the government.79 In the long run, the public interest in
fairness and the interest in governmental efficiency are fully consistent
since a fair system of contract awards increases the likelihood that
the government will obtain needed goods and services at the lowest
possible cost. Nonetheless, courts seem concerned, not with the general
problem of efficient procurement, but rather with the inefficiencies
that could result from extensive review of the particular contract
awards before them.
The courts have focused, in particular, on the problems involved in
substitution of judgment and the comparative competence of decision
makers.8 0 Because of their inexperience with the factors that contracting
76 Cf. id. §§ 30.01 et seq.

77 See R. NAsH & J. CMiNIC, supra note 14, at 221-22. See generally K.C. DAvis, DIsCRETIONARY JusrcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). The possibility of abuse is particularly great in an area such as government contracting where award of contracts worth
large sums of money depends on determinations made by one or a few people. Concern
over such possibilities led Congress as early as 1809 to enact legislation requiring open
award of government contracts. Act of Mar. 3, 1809, 19 ANNALS OF CONGRSS 1833, 1835
(1809).
78 See text at notes 112-17 infra.
79 See Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971);
A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v.
Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City Chem. Corp. v. Shreflier, 333 F. Supp. 46

(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970).

80

The comparative qualifications of courts and agencies to make certain kinds of de-
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officers must consider in making awards, courts have, in some bid protest cases, afforded only limited review even as to questions that concern
the interpretation of procurement statutes and regulations.,' Although
judges are generally more competent than government administrators
to interpret laws, 82 the issues that bidders have presented for judicial
review have depended, to a great extent, on highly specialized technical
knowledge. The courts have been asked, for example, to define what
constitutes responsiveness to a bid invitation in a particular case 83 and
to determine what degree of ambiguity in the invitation requires rejection of bids and readvertisement.84 The answers to these questions require detailed knowledge of the reasons for and significance of the bid's
specifications and of the problems involved in producing the items for
which the government proposes to contract.8 8 While it may be possible
to adduce expert testimony on such technical matters so that the judge
can make an informed decision, it is less expensive and time consuming
for the court to defer to the greater competence of those who have
already considered the case.
Courts have, therefore, generally been willing to defer to administrative expertise when an agency or official other than the original contracting officer has passed on the issue in dispute.8 8 They have accorded
considerable respect to the decisions of the GAO and the Small Business
Administration; 87 since Scanwell, the decisions of these agencies in bid
cisions is one of three considerations that Professor Davis has concluded guide courts generally in choosing a scope of review of "application of law." K.C. DAvis, supra note 75,

§ 30.09.
81 E.g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City
Chem. Corp. v. Shreffler, 333 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82 K.C. DAvis, supra note 75, § 30.09.
83 Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
84 M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970); A.G. Schoonmaker
Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85 In one case, for example, the determination of responsiveness on a bid for equipment for an Atomic Energy Commission plant necessitated deciding whether offering
transformers with top-mounted bushings and no terminal boxes was materially nonconforming to an invitation that specified sidewall bushings enclosed in terminal boxes. 38
Comr. GEN. 59, 61 (1958).
86 E.g., Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971);
A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
87 Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971), upheld a determination of small business status by the SBA, stating that technical expertise
was involved and deference would be given to the agency decision. In A.G. Schoonmaker
Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d
1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court, using a rational basis test, sustained findings by the
Comptroller General that the invitations were ambiguous and readvertisement was necessary. Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970), upheld a decision by the
Comptroller General that the low bid was nonresponsive.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:814

protest cases have, with one exception, been approved by the district
courts. 88 The appropriateness of a limited scope of review has been

premised, in particular, on the experience and expertise of the GAO, 89
even though the great majority of the GAO's decisions, perhaps as a
result of its limited function, have been in the government's favor.9 0
In addition to the pressures toward limited review exerted by the
greater competence of prior decision makers in evaluating bid protests,
the courts have been concerned with the effects of judicial review on the
ability of the government to procure goods and services expeditiously.
In several cases, courts have justified affording only limited review on
the ground that review delays final award of contracts, postpones delivery of goods and services, and defers the completion of necessary
government projects.9 1 The effects of delay and the degree to which
completion of a government project is vital to the public interest varies,
of course, from case to case. In most cases concerning judicial review of
administrative action, the public interest involved in a government
program can, to some extent, be measured by the degree of discretionary
authority vested by Congress in the officials charged with its operation.92 Procurement statutes, however, grant the same discretionary
authority to contracting officers with respect to all procurements, however trivial or important they may be.93 Courts have, therefore, used a
88 Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970), found, contrary to
the Comptroller General's decision, that a telegraphed bid modification would have been
received before the announced time for opening bids but for mishandling by government
officials and, therefore, was not "late" within the meaning of procurement regulations.
89 Judge Levanthal, writing for the majority in M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d
1289, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and in Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 131817 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stated emphatically that courts should give great weight to decisions
of the GAO, which has fifty years of experience in deciding bid protests, and should generally refrain from making a judicial determination of the controversy while a protest
is pending with the GAO.
90 See note 51 supra. By upholding GAO determinations, recognizing that they are
seldom favorable to the bidder, courts may be presenting bidders a dilemma: bidders may
protest to the GAO, which is quicker and less expensive than litigation, Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1971); but the GAO decision, which is
not likely to remedy the bidder's grievance, will probably prevent a contrary judicial determination.
91 E.g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City Chem. Corp.
v. Shreffler, 333 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
92 Cf. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 75, § 30.10.
93 One exception to this similar treatment of procurements which is of different importance is the agency's flexibility to negotiate where, because, for example, of urgent
need, advertising is not feasible. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1970); 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1970). While
some determinations are left to agency discretion, such as determining responsibility, 41
C.F.R. § 1-1.1204(a) (1972), and other determinations are prescribed explicitly by regulations, for example, the manner of bid solicitation, 32 C.F.R. §§ 2.200-2211 (1972); 41
C.F.R. §§ 1-2.201 to -2.208 (1972), the precise extent of a contracting officer's general dis-
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common-sense approach to assessing the public interest in avoiding
delay in procurement, allowing, for example, delay in contracting for
ballpoint pens94 but not for materials used to control radioactivity. 5
Courts have, in all cases, refused to delay procurements for national
defense, which have been the subject of a majority of bidders' suits."6
The problem of delay in government procurement has influenced, in
particular, the courts' decisions as to whether injunctive relief is appropriate. In most bid suits, bidders have sought preliminary injunctions delaying contract awards or performance. Although the issues of
scope of review and the appropriateness of injunctive relief are analytically distinct, both determinations require consideration of the
same interests. Perhaps because of this, the courts have often discussed
the two questions simultaneously.97 Among the factors courts consider
in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction are the probable
harm that an injunction would cause the defendant, the harm that
denial of an injunction would cause the plaintiff, and the effects of
injunctive relief on public interests.9 8 The usual defendant in a bid
cretionary authority is unclear. Cf. Hanes & S.B. Smith, The Contracting Officer: His
Authority to Act and Duty to Act Independently, 70 DicK. L. REv. 333 (1966); McIntire,
Authority of Government Contracting Officers: Estoppel and Apparent Authority, 25 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 162 (1951); Whelan & Dunigan, Government Contracts: Apparent Authority and Estoppel, 55 GEo. L.J. 830 (1967); Note, Government Contracts: The Consequences
of an ImproperAward, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 706 (1970).

04 Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), allowing suit for a mandatory injunction to require advertised bidding and withdrawal of a General Services
Administration letter of commitment to the National Industries for the Blind agreeing
to purchase pens from them.
95 City Chem. Corp. v. Shreffler, 333 F. Supp. 46 (S..N.Y. 1971), denying relief to a
disappointed bidder who asserted that the successful bidder was not a "manufacturer" of
the items to be procured as required by the Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
The Walsh-Healy Act specifically provides for judicial review of administrative interpretations of the term "manufacturer," 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1970), but the district court in
City Chemical held that, at least in the circumstances of that case, any reasonable interpretation of that term would be sustained.
98 A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (generator sets for the
Army); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (parachutes for the
Air Force); City Chem. Corp. v. Shreffler, 333 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (chemicals to
control radioactivity for the Navy); American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 492
(D.D.C. 1971) (advanced instrument landing systems for the Air Force); Lombard Corp.
v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970) (forging press lines to produce ammunition for
the Army).
97 See, e.g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
98 See, e.g., Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603, 619
(D.C. Cir. 1971). Two other factors generally considered in granting or denying preliminary injunctions are the probability of the plaintiff's success and the injunction's effect
on the status quo. The status quo would be preserved in virtually all bid cases by granting the preliminary injunction, which usually asks to have the contract award or performance stayed. Probability of success turns, in part, on the scope of review to be used:
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protest suit is the head of the procuring agency and, where a contract
has been awarded prior to the initiation of the suit, the successful
bidder.99 A preliminary injunction delaying procurement would, of
course, delay the government program for which the procurement is
proposed to be made. In addition to the harm to the government and
the public that may result from delaying necessary procurements, courts
have also been concerned with the harm that may result to the successful
bidder because of a preliminary injunction and uncertainty as to the
outcome of the suit.100 If the injunction is granted, the contractor may
incur substantial costs in maintaining the workers and equipment
necessary to perform the contract and may have difficulty in procuring
other contracts pending the court's final decision.
Against these interests of the government and contractors opposing
delay in contract awards or performance, courts must consider the
harm to the protesting bidder that may result from denial of a preliminary injunction. If a preliminary injunction has been denied, the
bidder who can prove his claim will, in all likelihood, not be entitled
to a final injunction awarding the contract to him since the factors that
prevent granting the preliminary injunction-the costs of delaymilitate at least as much against compelling transfer of the contract
once work on it has begun.
Denial of a preliminary, or final, injunction would weigh much
less harshly against the disappointed bidder if there were available
to him a damage remedy for denial of a contract in violation of procurement laws. Federal district courts may not, however, award more
than $10,000 in damages in suits brought against the federal government; 101 only the Court of Claims, which has limited awards in bidders'
the broader the scope of review, the greater the plaintiff's chance of success. Considering
probability of success in these cases would lead courts in a circle insofar as it depends on
the scope of review to be used, since the scope of review may be changed by the decision
on injunctive relief. See text at notes 109-10 infra.
99 E.g., Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971).
Even where the contractor is not a formal party to the dispute, if a recipient of the contract award has been designated, courts should recognize the effect of injunctive relief on
his interests.
100 The uncertainty for the contractor depends on the remedy ultimately available to
a successful protester. An injunctive remedy renders the contract uncertain, while a damage remedy does not affect the contractor. Several courts have expressed a preference for
awarding damages as opposed to injunctions in bid cases. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City Chem. Corp. v. Shreffler, 333 F.
Supp. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684, 687-88
(D.D.C. 1970). However, the damage remedy already provided in a limited group of cases
has yet to be granted. See text and note at note 55 supra.
101 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1970).
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suits to bid preparation expenses,' 0 2 may award damages greater than
this amount. 0 3 Since bid preparation expenses often amount to several
times $10,000,104 bidders can recover them fully only in the Court of
Claims. At the same time, however, these expenses account for only
a small proportion of the damages the bidder has incurred since he will
also have lost the profits that he could reasonably have expected to gain
had he received the contract award. 0 5 Despite this absence of a full

damage remedy, the courts have generally held the disappointed bidder's interests outweighed by the necessity of avoiding delays in procurement. Since Scanwell, few preliminary injunctions have been
granted; and in the few cases in which district courts have granted
injunctions, the courts of appeals have reversed. 0 6
III.

RELIEF FOR BIDDERS:

THE

ROLE OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS

Recent cases continue to cite Scanwell for the proposition that disappointed bidders, as representatives of their own interests and of the
public's interest in fairness, have standing to bring actions for judicial
review of their claims that agency actions violating procurement statutes

and regulations have deprived them of contract awards. 107 Yet the same
102 Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Heyer Prods. Co. v.
United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
103 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1970).
104 For example, in Robert F. Simmons & Assocs. v. United States, 360 F.2d 962 (Ct.
C1. 1966), the plaintiff spent $23,028.73 in bid preparation.
105 These lost profits are likely to be the major damage to the plaintiff; logically, a
bidder would not spend nearly so much in preparing his bid as he would stand to make
from the contract if he were to gain the award. The large face amounts of many contracts,
for example, $32 million for the contract contested in M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455
F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970), also suggest substantial expected profits.
106 A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 726
(D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, Civil No. 2422-70 (D.D.C. Sept 3, 1970),
rev'd, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 319 F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C.
1970), revd, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lloyd Wood Constr. Co. v. Sandoval, 318 F.
Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ala. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr.
Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971). An injunction was issued in General Elec. Co. v. Seamans,
340 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972) designed not to delay contract award, but to prevent action
by one company (Philco) that would inhibit the plaintiff-company (General Electric) from
effectively performing the contract if, as the court found likely, its protest to the GAO
was successful. The contract in that case was for operation of Air Force tracking stations,
and the injunction restrained Philco, to whom the contract was awarded by the agency,
from contracting with the personnel presently operating the stations to prevent the employees' availability to General Electric.
107 A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v.
Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City Chem. Corp. v. Shreffler, 333 F. Supp. 46
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1971); Lombard
Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d
1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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decisions have effectively cut off judicial review of bid protests. The
disappointed bidder has generally been unable to obtain independent
review of the legality of contract awards, to secure an injunction delaying award of or work under a contract, or to gain compensation for lost
profits from a wrongfully denied contract. This subordination of the
bidder's and the public's interests in fairness to the demands of efficient
government operations may not, however, be necessary. The Court of
Claims, by affording a fully compensatory damage remedy, could at
once protect the interests of bidders and, at the same time, avoid the
inefficiencies that have frequently been cited as justifying limited review.
The Court of Claims has, without giving the matter much space in
its opinions, generally followed the decisions of the district courts and
courts of appeals in limiting the scope of review appropriate to bidders'
suits.1 08 Many of the factors that militate against broad review of contract awards in suits brought in the district courts would, however, lose
much of their force if the Court of Claims were to become the predominant forum for litigation of bid disputes. First, it may often be necessary for district courts to deny preliminary injunctions delaying contract awards in order to avoid impairing vital government projects. 10 9
This general refusal to grant injunctions removes one of the justifications for limited judicial review since, if procurement is not postponed
by injunction, review need not be limited in order to minimize delay.
Because the Court of Claims cannot, in any case, afford injunctive
relief, the problem of delay cannot serve to justify a limited scope of
review. Second, the courts have, as noted above, often cited their relative
inexpertness in procurement matters as reason for limiting review. If,
however, the Court of Claims were to become the primary judicial
forum for bid protests, it would be in a position to acquire considerable
expertise concerning government bidding and could review at least
nondiscretionary agency decisions involved in contract awards for their
correctness rather than merely their rationality. 110
Because of their consistent refusal to grant injunctions and because of
the statutory limit on the amount of damages they can assess,"' the
108 See, e.g., Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 455 F.2d 556, 559-60 (Ct. Cl. 1972);
Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
109 M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City Chem.
Corp. v. Shreffier, 333 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317
F. Supp. 684, 687-88 (D.D.C. 1970).
110 The Court of Claims has already had an opportunity to acquire considerable expertise on government contracting through its jurisdiction over disputes and terminations
under the Wunderlich Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970); U.S. Cr. CL. R. 161 et seq.
111 See text and notes at notes 101-03 supra.
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district and appellate courts have made the Court of Claims the logical
forum for the litigation of bidders' complaints. Despite the unavailability of injunctive relief, however, the Court of Claims has refused
to afford to disappointed bidders an effective remedy in damages.
Neither in Heyer Products"12 nor in Keco Industries'" did the Court
of Claims explain why bid preparation expenses alone should be
awarded to bidders able to demonstrate that they had been deprived of
contracts by noncompliance with or misapplication of federal procurement laws. In Heyer Products, the court held that an invitation for
bids constitutes an implied contract that all bids will be fairly considered, and that, if an invitation is made in bad faith, bidders who have
relied upon it can recover. In Keco Industries, the court extended this
implied contract theory to cases not involving bad faith invitation,
holding, in effect, that the invitation constitutes an implied contract
that the procuring agency will consider bids in accordance with all
applicable statutes and regulations. The court should distinguish between two classes of disappointed bidders. Bidders who have relied
upon the implied contract contained in a bid invitation but who would
not have received the contract award even if the procuring agency had
acted in good faith and complied with procurement law should be
entitled to recover bid preparation expenses. But a bidder who would
have received the award had the implied contract of good faith and
compliance not been breached should be entitled to more: the profits
he could reasonably have expected to derive if he had been awarded the
procurement contract.11 4
112
113

140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. CI. 1956).
428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).

114 The contract that the Court of Claims has found implied in the invitation of bids

and promulgation of regulations ostensibly controlling contract award is arguably analogous to a sales contract with the bidder in the role of seller. Under the UNIFO M COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-708(2) (1972 version), the seller would be entitled to his lost profits.
The general theory in contract law is that damages protect the expectation interest,
that is, they provide the party injured by breach with the equivalent of contract performance. E.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). But see Fuller
& Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936). Cases
refusing to give a party injured by breach of contract the profits lost as a result of the
breach are an exception to this general rule. Most of these cases are distinguishable from
the situation faced in government contracting in that the profits lost in those cases were
generally speculative, to have been earned over an indefinite number of years and without
reasonably reliable data to indicate their amount. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684
(D.C. Cir. 1948); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). Loss
of a government contract generally deprives the bidder of a reasonably ascertainable

amount to be earned over a short time. Thus, even if one accepts the hypothesis of the
Court of Claims-that damages are given to the disappointed for breach of an implied
contract-the damages given should include lost profits. There is, however, a more plausible basis for damages that militates more strongly in favor of awarding lost profits.
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The Court of Claims has remained silent as to its reason for limiting
damage awards to bid preparation expenses whether or not the bidder
should have been awarded the contract. It has been suggested, however,
that this refusal to award expected profits is justified because, in certain
circumstances, the government, unlike a private party to a contract,
often has authority to terminate a contract after it has been awarded,
thus depriving a contractor of his prospective profits.11 5 While the
government's right to terminate should perhaps be a factor in determining what profits a bidder could reasonably have expected, 116 it does
not justify excluding lost profits entirely from the bidder's damage
award.11 7 Since the government can only terminate under certain condiDamage remedies for breach of contract give the contracting parties flexibility while
holding them within their intended bargain. See 0. HOLMES, ELEMENTS OF CoNTRAcT IN
THE COMMON

LAw 235-36 (M. Howe ed. 1963); J. STORY, 2 EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE

25 (1836).

One party may find it more economical to breach the contract, knowing that he must
pay the other party the amount that that party could reasonably have expected to receive
through performance of the contract. This choice, rooted in the individual's assessment
of his economic best interest, is allowed to the contracting individual to preserve his
economic freedom while enforcing the spirit of his promise. But there is no analogous
interest of the federal government in knowingly breaking its promise, at least where
that promise is in the form of law. The contracting officer is directed by law to award
contracts in a given fashion. One might argue that it would be more efficient to allow
the contracting officer this choice, but Congress has stated that the interest in efficiency
does not require that such discretion be given to administrative officers. To the extent
that paying lost profits deters violations of law, it is warranted to enforce the statutes;
furthermore, the party injured by breach of a promise, where allowing the breach advances
a recognized interest (economic freedom of choice), should be no better off than the party
injured by a violation of law that advances no interest.
115 M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
116 The court could determine the percentage of contracts, or of contracts of a particular type, that are cancelled and reduce the bidder's recovery by that percentage, or
courts could devise any number of other formulae to allow for the possibility of "termination for the government's convenience."
117 This refusal of the Court of Claims to grant loss profits seems inconsistent with the
result reached in Allen M. Campbell Co. v. United States, No. 397-70 (Ct. Cl., Oct. 13, 1972).
In this case the Court of Claims granted standard damages for termination, including
some lost profits, to a bidder whose contract award had been rescinded after a district
court held that the bidder was not a small business as required for the contract at issue.
Lloyd Wood Constr. Co. v. Sandoval, 318 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ala. 1970). Campbell, the
bidder losing in the district court, appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the district
court's decision and held the rescission and award to the next low bidder, Wood, improper. The Court of Appeals failed, however, to grant relief since Wood had nearly
completed the contract work. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d
261 (5th Cir. 1971). In granting termination-of-contract damages to Campbell, the Court
of Claims relied on an earlier ruling that a Small Business Administration determination
of small business status is conciusive, so that even if Campbell did not meet the statutory
test for small business status, it could not be denied the contract on that ground. MidWest Constr., Ltd. v. United States, 387 F.2d 957 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Rescission of a contract
not awarded in accordance with statutory criteria, other than for small business status,
or improper denial of a contract on other grounds would, under the Keco rule, have
precluded the grant of any damages for lost profits.

1972]

Government Contract Bid Protests

tions, it is no answer to the bidder's claim to lost profits that, even if
he had been awarded the contract, he would not have received the profits had those conditions occurred.
SUMMARY

Although federal courts have recognized that bidders for government
contracts and the public have an interest in having contracts awarded
according to the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations,
decisions since Scanwell have refused to protect these interests because
of conflicting interests in governmental efficiency. Judicial deference
to decisions of administrative agencies, particularly the GAO, has
deprived the protesting bidder of an independent determination of
the meaning of procurement statutes and regulations as applied to
his case. By limiting the scope of review, the courts have subordinated
enforcement of procurement laws to the efficient operation of the
government.
Federal district and appellate courts have generally considered the
scope of review of agency contract decisions together with the propriety
of granting injunctions delaying contract awards. Emphasizing the
greater competence of administrative decision makers and the need
to avoid interfering with important government functions, courts have
announced a limited scope of review and denied injunctions delaying
contract awards. By severely limiting the availability of injunctive
relief, the district and appellate courts have made the Court of Claims
the logical forum for bid suits, thereby enabling one court to acquire
competence in bid matters. Because it can grant only damage remedies,
the Court of Claims need not be concerned with the problem of delaying contract awards; it should, therefore, recognize that the factors
that support limited review by the district courts of agency contract
decisions do not necessarily justify the same limitations on the review
that it affords. The Court of Claims should, in addition, expand the
available damage remedy to compensate bidders fully for the loss they
have incurred because of administrative failure to comply with procurement laws. By doing so, the court could afford an effective remedy for
bidders and thus help to maintain the integrity of the government
procurement process.
Ronald A. Cass

